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National Intelligence Daily

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
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| PHILIPPINES: Assassination of Aquino | | |
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| Opposition parties, already preparing for No elections next May, are certain to capitalize on killing. | | he |
| Press reports indicate Aquino was shot while airport security officials after arriving from Taip three-year, self-imposed exile in the US. The all killed immediately by security forces. | ei at the end of a | ila |
| The large crowd of supporters that had ass | embled to areet | |
| Aquino was dispersed peacefully, and there are unrest so far. | | |
| | | |
| Comment : Widespread violence is unlikely, can be expected in the days ahead. Aquino was most Filipinos will conclude that the government assassination. | s a popular figure, a | s nd |
| Aquino's death may serve as a unifying fore fragmented opponents of the government and polarization of Philippine politics. Domestic rea | may accelerate the ctions are unlikely to | |
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


WEST GERMANY: Christian Democrats' Support of INF

| Alfred Dregger and Juergen Todenhoefer, speaking for the party's parliamentary caucus, emphasize that INF will contribute to West German security following the USSR's arms buildup of recent years. They say that the cruise missile alone would not be an adequate deterrent to the Soviet SS-20s and that only the Pershing II would supply the necessary "numerical and qualitative equality." 25X1 Both spokesmen reject the "walk-in-the-woods" formula, because it excludes the Pershing II. In addition, they reject the inclusion of British and French systems in the INF negotiations. They demand that the SS-20s stationed in the western USSR be dismantled. 25X1 Comment: The position of the caucus confirms that Chancellor Kohl has enough political support to proceed with deployment later this year, if no agreement is reached in Geneva. The statement will help solidify the government's position during the Bundestag debate on INF in November. 25X1 The remarks help dispel public confusion about the government's position. Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher earlier had suggested the "walk-in-the-woods" formula be reexamined at Geneva, ostensibly because it avoided consideration of British and French systems. The press, however, has speculated on Bonn's possible willingness to sacrifice the Pershing II's. Many West German conservatives have become concerned that US officials believe Bonn's support of INF deployments this fall is deteriorating. The two spokesmen meant to reassure officials in | Two Christian Democratic spokesmen have reaffirmed West German support for the US negotiating stance in Geneva, particularly the need for retaining a mix of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. | 25X1 |
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PAKISTAN: Attempt To Spread Protests

Province.

| The left-center opposition is trying to expand demonstrations into other areas of Pakistan. |
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| Protests are continuing in Sind Province, and opposition leaders say they will begin to offer themselves for arrest tomorrow in Punjab. In Baluchistan Province, an important independent leftist party has |
| joined the campaign and called a general strike for tomorrow. |
| |
| Comment: Opponents of President Zia have shown unexpected |

strength in Sind, but they will have to carry out protests in Punjab Province if they are to threaten the government. Conservative politicians as well as most student and labor leaders apparently are not yet ready to confront Zia. Without them, the center and left parties are unlikely to have sufficient strength to challenge Zia outside Sind

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IRAN: Factional Struggle Continues

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| Iranian clerics who support radical domestic policies have exploited recent popular protests over economic conditions to move against their conservative rivals. | 25X1 |
| The Commerce Minister and the Labor Minister, who support a | |
| free economy and are associated with the conservative Hojatieh Society, were forced to resign early this month following a series of public demonstrations in Tehran and other cities over economic conditions. The Assembly criticized the Commerce Minister for the rise in the price of rice following the relaxation of government controls in July and for his close ties to merchants accused of hoarding essential commodities. The Labor Minister was denounced for | |
| drafting a labor law that deemphasized workers' rights. | 25X1 |
| The Hojatieh Society announced late last month that it was suspending public activities in response to pointed criticism of the group in a speech by Ayatollah Khomeini. Rival clerics are calling for the dissolution of the Society and the arrest of unnamed conservative supporters. The regime has acknowledged that violent clashes occurred between adherents of the radical and conservative factions | |
| early this summer. | 25X1 |
| Comment : The radicals, who were on the defensive last spring when the conservatives successfully led a crackdown on the Tudeh Communist Party, are trying to use the economic problems and Khomeini's criticism of the conservative group to increase their political strength. The Hojatieh group, however, remains influential. | 25X1 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 20/(1 |
| The delay in naming new commerce and labor ministers suggests that the two factions are engaged in a vigorous, behind-the-scenes competition over the selection of replacements for these posts. Foreign policy issues and the succession to Khomeini also figure in | |
| the debates between the two groups. | 25 X 1 |
| The power struggle between the two factions is likely to continue, with neither gaining a decisive advantage in the near term. In the past, Khomeini has acted to ensure that neither faction becomes dominant. | |
| He probably would do so again, if either seemed to be achieving such a position. | 25X1 |
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EL SALVADOR: Military Strengthens Performance

| The military has considerably improved its combat effectiveness, discipline, and morale | |
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| Army leaders are said to be encouraged by the performance of their troops in the field—especially the four | 25X1 |
| US-trained immediate reaction battalions—and by what several amnesty seekers have described as a deterioration of querrilla morale. | 25 X 1 |
| | 25X1 |
| Comment: General Vides appears to be gaining greater prestige in the military, and his commitment to new counterinsurgency tactics is an improvement over his predecessor. General Garcia. | 25X1 25X1 |

USSR-NORTH KOREA: Strained Relations

The annual public exchanges between Moscow and P'yongyang on the anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japan reveal growing strains in their relations. The North Korean message this year is cooler in describing friendship for Moscow, and the Soviet declaration is more restrained in praising President Kim II-song's domestic achievements.

Comment: North Korea's increasing alignment with China—evidenced by the visits to Beijing over the past year by Kim II-song and his son and heir-apparent, Kim Chong-il—probably is a principal factor behind the coolness in its relations with the USSR. The two sides also differ on Moscow's expanding contacts with South Korea and other issues. The North Koreans have tried hard to persuade the Soviets not to attend the Inter-Parliamentary Union conference in Seoul next month. Nonetheless, the visit to Seoul last month by the Soviet national who is the Union's deputy secretary general suggests the Soviets will attend.


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INDONESIA: Renewed Fighting on East Timor

| The insurgents on East Timor have resumed their attacks on | |
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| government forces, following the collapse of four-month-old negotiations. Armed Forces | 25X1 |
| Commander Murdani | 25X1 |
| | 25X1 |
| has publicly threatened that the Army would "str | ike 25X1 |
| without mercy" those insurgents refusing to capitulate. | 25 X 1 |
| Comment : Murdani is moving quickly to demonstrate his cornof the situation, | ntrol 25X1 |
| Nevertheless, resumption of fighting is a setback for Jakarta's efforts to resolve East Timor issue. It will weaken Indonesia's chances for defeating annual resolution at the UN General Assembly condemning its takeover of East Timor. The insurgents probably hope the renewanilitary pressure will strengthen their international support before | e the g the al of e the |
| UN debate. | 25 X 1 |

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